Dual-process theories: A metacognitive perspective

By Valerie A. Thompson. 2009

287 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3c9bed3a7b26eb53c0569bcb86cc1eed2e3e31a3

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Citations in the corpus

The nature of epistemic feelings (2014, background): “These remarks suggest two levels of representational complexity that may correspond to two levels of development of the mind; in particular, two levels of metacognitive capacity (Arango-Muñoz, 2011; Koriat, 2000; Thompson, 2009).”
Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications (2014, background): “For example, Thompson and colleagues (e.g., Thompson, 2009; Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012) have recently suggested that the switch decision might be affective in nature (but see also Alter, Oppenheimer, & Epley, 2013).”
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013, unknown): “The disposition to override intuitions is a function of several factors, including the metacognitive feeling of rightness in the initial intuition (Thompson, 2009; Thompson, Turner, & Pennycock, 2011).”
Bias and Conflict A Case for Logical Intuitions (2012, background): “Hence, the postulated logical intuition can be conceived as a “gut feeling” (e.g., Franssens and De Neys, 2009; Thompson, 2009): People will be aware that there is something fishy about their heuristic response, but they will not be able to put their finger on it and explain why their response is qu”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “, & Thompson, V. A. (2006). Confidence and accuracy in deductive”
Why your stigma isn't hired : a dual-process framework of interview bias (2016, background): “Dual-process theory suggests that this possibly results from Type 2 processes that work on incomplete information, as the incoming information is interpreted and filtered by Type 1 processes (Arbuthnott, Arbuthonott, & Thompson, 2005; Evans&Over, 2013;Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Thompson, 2009).”
On the Goals of Epistemic Education: Promoting Apt Epistemic Performance (2018, background): “Well-calibrated epistemic judgments of one’s knowledge, understanding, and confidence— that is, judgments that are correlated with what one actually knows and understands—can result in better management of information seeking and processing (Koriat, 2007; Thompson, 2009).”
The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory (2014, background): “the ‘reflective mind’ of Stanovich, 2009), as a separate Type 3 process (Evans, 2009) or as a product of metacognitive processes (Thompson, 2009).”
Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective (2010, background): “Possibilities include the amount of time available, presence or absence of competing demands, motivation to think “rationally,” and feelings of confidence in the initial intuition (Thompson, 2009).”
Nudge: Concept, Effectiveness, and Ethics (2017, background): “A second claim is that they differ depending on the extent to which metacognitive processes are invoked (Thompson, 2009); metacognition broadly refers to explicit knowledge or beliefs of factors that affect the outcome of a cognitive operation.”
Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning (2019, background): “Specifically, they bring to mind judgements or candidate responses of some kind accompanied by a feeling of confidence or rightness in that judgement, as proposed by Valerie Thompson and colleagues (Thompson, 2009; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).”