Reflections on reflection: the nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning
By Jonathan Evans. Thinking and Reasoning, 2019
127 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed that A: Type 2 processes serve to rationalise and support intuitive choices. For most of its history, however, such accounts have emphasised instead B: Type 2 processes reason to conclusions or decisions. B is part of the “received theory” of dual processing, often inaccurately linked to the idea that Type 2 reasoning is necessary for correct solutions. While not mutually exclusive, the evidence for each proposition is assessed. I then present a default-interventionist model which incorporates both propositions A and B. This is consistent with evidence that reasoning to support the default intuition is the norm, although intervention may also occur. Other issues discussed include (1) whether we should treat Type 2 as well as Type 1 processing as originating from multiple systems, (2) whether we need to separate postulate “Type 3” processes to explain underlying cognitive control and attention switching, and (3) whether recent experimental observations of “logical intuitions” undermine the default-interventionist approach. I point to some new directions in which research on dual processes may proceed.
Subfields: Applied Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/befa2bc9e30182bdb22ef67d81fb2f07b3457997
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In Applied Psychology
In Cognitive Neuroscience
In General Decision Sciences
Citations in the corpus
- Dual process theory 2.0 (2020, background): “No normative system for reasoning can tell us that it is both valid to infer Y from X and invalid to infer Y from X. Evans (2019) continues to develop his important comments on recent research in DPT.”