Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India

By J. Sarkar, Subrata Sarkar. 2000

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey (2002, background): “Empirical evidence on the roles of institutional investors in Asia is sparse.5 Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) examine the roles of large shareholders in corporate performance in India.”
Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Pakistan (2008, result): “The owner-managers shows positive and significant impact on the firm performance in Table 4 and this result is in agreement with Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) who find that block-holdings by directors’ increase firm value.”
Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing economies: evidence from Nigeria (2009, background): “In related work from India, Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)”
Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: some empirical findings from India (2013, background): “Many scholars have studied the effect of ownership by different group on Indian companies (Dwivedi and Jain, 2005; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Salerka, 2005), but none of these studies gives any particular reference on the effect of promoter ownership on firm performance.”
Corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets: Evidence from Turkey (2019, background): “Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) stress that the performance of younger firm is higher because younger firms are likely to have newer assets relative to mature firms; hence, they are more likely to be able to comply with environmental legislation and it easier for them to position themselves in the market…”
Does ownership structure of emerging-market firms affect their outward FDI? The case of the Indian automotive and pharmaceutical sectors (2010, background): “5 Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) demonstrated that foreign investors have an impact on performance of domestic India firms after they reach the threshold of about 25% equity ownership.”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA (2014, background): “Larger firms can be less efficient than smaller ones because of delegation of authority to subordinates over strategic and operational activities within the firm (Himmelberg et al., 1999;Sarkar and Sarkar,2000).”
Current debates in global strategy (2009, unknown): “Owing to this trend towards conformity, shareholder activism – an unheard of phenomenon in many parts of the world – is becoming more visible (Dharwadkar et al. 2000; Sarkar and Sarkar 2000).”
Analysis of Board Size and Firm Performance: Evidence from NSE Companies Using Panel Data Approach (2016, methodology): “Tobin’s Q has been used in a wide number of previous studies (Bhagat & Bolton, 2009; Guest, 2009; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Yermack, 1996).”
Institutional Antecedents of Corporate Governance Legitimacy (2008, background): “Unfortunately, most studies of corporate governance are largely ethnocentric and predominantly Anglo-American (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Turnbull, 1997).”
Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets?: Evidence from India (2012, unknown): “In India, by contrast, legal processes are long drawn and expensive, and large blockholders like financial institutions play little role in disciplining a firm’s management (see Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).”