Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting

By J. P. O'Connor, Richard L. Priem, Joseph E. Coombs, K. Gilley. 2006

281 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31f573f2cc259859c56f9a3021ae64c0e63aa564

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Citations in the corpus

The age-effect of financial indicators as buffers against the liability of newness ☆ (2010, background): “First, there is a perceived increase in the discretion in financial reporting (Beaver et al., 2005) and suggestions that executives may inappropriately use this discretion to manipulate financial reports for their own gain (e.g., Beaver et al., 2005; O'Connor et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2008).”
Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “However, recent research (e.g., O’Connor et al., 2006; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007) challenges whether stock options are universally beneficial; instead, they may drive managerial behavior that could lead to very positive or very negative outcomes.”
Investor Perceptions of Financial Misconduct: The Heterogeneous Contamination of Bystander Firms (2015, methodology): “Indeed, some previous research has exclusively focused on this type of restatements (e.g., O’Connor et al., 2006).”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “For example, the effect of CEO stock option grants is amplified when the BOD possesses more stock options or the CEO is also the chairperson but to a lesser degree when both conditions are present (O’Connor et al., 2006).”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, methodology): “Recently, a few studies (e.g., Erickson et al., 2006; O’Connor et al., 2006) have indicated that stock options have an inconsistent impact on the likelihood of accounting fraud.”
Trust Repair After An Organization-Level Failure (2009, methodology): “…supported by systems and multilevel theory and by research and case studies on organizational failures and crises (see Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; O’Connor et al., 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003).2 We distinguish the role of internal and external system components in…”
A comparison of alternative measures of organizational aspirations (2014, methodology): “…been used not only in numerous studies in strategy and organization theory (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al. 2006; Dunn, 2004; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; O’Connor et al., 2006), but also in finance (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006) and accounting (e.g., Desai et al., 2006; Erickson et al., 2006;…”
CEO demographics and accounting fraud: Who is more likely to rationalize illegal acts? (2011, background): “A broad swath of research on executive stock options concludes that CEO stock options provide incentives for fraudulent acts by executives (Beasley et al., 2001; Jensen, 2001; O’Connor et al., 2006 Tosi et al., 2000; Uzun et al., 2004).”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “However, market-based measures are noisy and more difficult for executives to directly influence (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Murphy, 1999). For example, Murphy (2000) recently found that firms tying executive pay to accounting-based performance measures were more likely to show evidence of income ”
Does Stakeholder Management have a Dark Side? (2009, background): “, 2006; Ouchi, 1980). When the contribution of the employee cannot be assessed unambiguously, opportunism will go unnoticed (Ouchi, 1980). When this is the case, an unethical agent could exploit the circumstance and "free-ride." Carson et al. (2006) find that the likelihood of opportunistic behavior”