Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data
By C. Daily, D. Dalton, Albert A. Cannella. 2003
2,318 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2589d230fc1d6634eb2edf3093c920512bd7b783
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alfredo De Massis
- James J. Chrisman
- Mike Wright
- J. Kotlar
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Jess H. Chua
- Franz Willi Kellermanns
- Ruth V. Aguilera
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- James J. Chrisman
- J. Kotlar
- Jess H. Chua
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Mike Wright
- Franz Willi Kellermanns
- Alessandro Minichilli
In Strategy and Management
- Ruth V. Aguilera
- Collins G. Ntim
- Mike Wright
- Jiangyong Lu
- James D. Westphal
- Xiaohui Liu
- Michael K. Bednar
- Mike W. Peng
Citations in the corpus
- Diversity is strategy: the effect of R&D team diversity on innovative performance (2017, neutral): “Women usually differ in experience and career trajectories from their male counterparts (Daily et al., 2003), but rather than equating to less experience, it suggests highly diverse human and social capital backgrounds, which might contribute to enhanced performance (Singh et al., 2008).”
- GETTING THEM TO THINK OUTSIDE THE CIRCLE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CEOS' EXTERNAL ADVICE NETWORKS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (2008, background): “However, there is little empirical evidence that institutional investors affect executive behavior or corporate policy independently of board monitoring (that is, institutions may exert indirect influence by pressuring boards to monitor CEOs) (Black, 1998; Daily et al., 2003; Kang & Sorenson, 1999).”
- Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “It therefore plays a key role in the overall overseeing of the company and the monitoring of top management in particular (Jensen and Meckling 1976; John and Senbet 1998; Daily et al. 2003; Chatterjee et al. 2003).”
- Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008, background): “…led scholars to criticize agency theory for its simplistic, rational predictions about human behavior, the majority of compensation research and practice remains firmly entrenched in these rational financial–economic assumptions (Daily et al. 2003, Rynes et al. 2005, Wiseman and GomezMejia 1998).”
- Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “…mainly focused on issues such as board size, inside versus outside directors (also known as executive versus non-executive directors), separation of CEO and Chair positions, etc (Dalton et al., 1998; Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Daily et al., 2003) with an aim to improve the effectiveness of oversight.”
- Effort, Performance, and Conscientiousness: An Agency Theory Perspective (2007, background): “Daily, Dalton, and Cannella (2003) noted that agency theory has become the predominant theory of governance, and thus many applications of agency theory research focus on owners and CEOs of large organizations.”
- Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions (2010, background): “Internally, boards of directors (Daily et al., 2003), executive compensation (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002), and ownership structures (Dalton et al.”
- Board Task Evolution: A Longitudinal Field Study in the UK (2013, neutral): “The difficulty of access to boards and directors is well documented in the literature (Daily et al., 2003; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007).”