Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance

By Rachel M. Hayes, Scott Schaefer. 2000

248 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/150990344a8847b49d7d34b0562ef01419aee62e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. J. Bol
2. Stefan Reichelstein
3. Madhav V. Rajan
4. Raj Mashruwala
5. Rajiv D. Banker
6. Rachel M. Hayes
7. Elizabeth A. Gordon
8. Ellen Engel

In Economics and Econometrics

1. J. Bol
2. Madhav V. Rajan
3. Stefan Reichelstein
4. Rachel M. Hayes
5. Pattarin Adithipyangkul
6. Ellen Engel
7. Rajiv D. Banker
8. Raj Mashruwala

Citations in the corpus

• Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China (2011, background): “In opposition to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) argues that managers’ wages can be adjusted, ex ante or ex post, to account for the managers’ consumption of perks so that the perks can be part of an optimal contract rather than an agency cost.”
• The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms (2002, background): “Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith [1996] and Hayes and Schaefer [2000] show that”
• Determinants and Effects of Subjectivity in Incentives (2004, unknown): “Hayes and Schaefer (2000) infer the use of subjectivity from the degree of variation in CEO compensation that is unexplained by variation in current observable firm performance.”
• Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The Case of Executive Compensation (2003, unknown): “In addition, it may be optimal for a manager to be (partly) compensated based on operating results that are anticipated in the future due to actions taken in the current year (Hayes and Schaefer, 2000).”
• Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers (2007, unknown): “An often-voiced concern is that managers will allocate too much attention to tasks that have an immediate impact on performance at the cost of tasks whose benefits will be realized in the future (Hemmer 1996; Hayes and Schaefer 2000; Smith 2002).”
• Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies (2011, background): “Previous studies, such us Core et al. (1999) and Hayes and Schaefer (2000) , use this approach to verify whether the excess compensation is a form of rent extraction or the implicit premium for unobserved qualities of the board.”
• The Determinants and Performance Effects of Managers’ Performance Evaluation Biases (2011, background): “These studies examine the role of subjectivity in incentive systems and show that introducing subjectivity improves contracts by mitigating incentive distortions or reducing risk (Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995; Hayes and Schaefer 2000; Gibbs et al. 2004).”
• The Moderating Role of Competition in the Relationship between Nonfinancial Measures and Future Financial Performance (2007, background): “We are interested in examining whether employee satisfaction and customer satisfaction are correlated with some of the subjective factors used in the performance evaluations of managers (Hayes and Schaefer 2000 ).”
• Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, unknown): “Hayes and Schaefer (2000) offer evidence consistent with the use of implicit contracts and subjective performance evaluation .”