Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The Case of Executive Compensation

By Kin Lo. 2003

180 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e55e1b90b89c0244adbadbf05f136f1ea3a8d634

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Citations in the corpus

Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2007, unknown): “Although Cohen et al. (2004b) document a significant decline in the 24Based on Lo (2003)’s method, the bootstrapped p-values are calculated as follows: one-tailed p-values are the percentage of 1000 repetitions that generate coefficients greater than the OLS coefficients in the table (less than the…”
Sec Scrutiny and the Evolution of Non-Gaap Reporting (2008, unknown): “For example, Lo (2003) examines the SEC’s 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules and reports evidence consistent with a governance improvement hypothesis.”
A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2009, unknown): “…Lo, 2003); Past Lobbying on Proxy Rules is an indicator variable if the firm has lobbied against new rules on proxy fights adopted by the SEC in 1992 (See Lo, 2003); the firm’s audit fees, expressed in millions $, calculated in year 2001; Discretionary Accruals are calculated in year 2001…”
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions (2007, unknown): “Following Lo (2003), we elect to use market-model abnormal returns because there were large, likely non-SOX related market movements throughout our SOX-passage event window, and these market movements are unlikely to have affected all firms equally.”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “Subramanian looked too hard for an explanation for his results, and Rauh and Low accepted his explanation too uncritically. Before relying on subtle law stories, non-experts would do well to vet them with experts. The finance coauthor of this paper (Atanasov) assessed Low (2009) as a likely “good pr”
The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt (2009, unknown): “2 As a result, prior studies on mandatory disclosure tend to examine the economic consequences of new disclosure regulations rather than the level of compliance with pre-existing regulations (see, for example, Bushee & Leuz, 2005; Lo, 2003).”
SEC Comment Letters and Insider Sales (2016, unknown): “1 Note that the term “comment letter” can also refer to letters written by the public to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or SEC that argue for or against proposed rules (see Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1996; Lo 2003; Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen 2009; Bamber, Jiang, Petron”
Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, unknown): “…X X 52 | P a g e Jayachandran (2006) Johnson and Mitton (2003) Khwaja and Mian (2005) Kim (2008) Lee and Baik (2010) Leuz and OberholzerGee (2006) Liebman and Reynolds (2006) Lo (2003) Lu (2011) Marsh (1998) Mathur and Singh (2011) McGuire et al. (1988) McKay and WebbYackee (2007) Mian et al.”
Does Mandatory Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in the European Union Reduce the Cost of Equity Capital (2009, unknown): “…impact of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, the 1999 Eligibility Rule for the OTC Bulletin Board, the 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules, or the regulations concerning municipal debt issues (e.g., Lo 2003; Bushee and Leuz 2005; Greenstone et al. 2006; Baber and Gore 2008).”
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? (2010, unknown): “12 Lo (2003) shows that the 1992 revision of executive compensation disclosure rules adds value to the firms that lobby against the rule change.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Murphy (2002) and Hall and Murphy (2003) argue that directors, shareholders, and possibly even executives themselves systematically underestimate the cost of option pay.”