# Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review

By Avinash Dixit. 2002

1,087 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1429bb34a9c2c738ab597454c026b1fc7cb81321

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Citations in the corpus

Disentangling the Sources of Pro-socially Motivated Effort: A Field Experiment (2010, background): “…selection of workers, the provision of effort and organizational design, see for instance, Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Dixit (2002), Francois (2000, 2007), Glazer (2004), Murdock (2002).2 Typically, two alternative views of altruism have been considered (a)Warm glow…”
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems (2010, background): “As Dixit (2002) observed, these richer “real world””
Management Control, Results-Oriented Culture and Public Sector Performance: Empirical Evidence on New Public Management (2015, background): “Ambiguous goals are common in the public sector (Burgess & Ratto, 2003; Dixit, 2002; Tirole, 1994), which hinders selection of appropriate performance measures (Cavalluzzo & Ittner, 2004).”
State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, positive): “Given that society essentially delegates the monitoring function to government representatives (Dixit, 2002), the choice of SOE managers may be guided by political rather than technical criteria (Li & Xia, 2007; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013).”
Incentives and Test-Based Accountability in Education (2011, background): “Although these goals are not inconsistent, they all compete for the limited education resources that are available and, ultimately, require schools to make difficult tradeoffs among them (Dixit, 2002).”
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents (2005, background): “In terms of the current approach, this must lie in the way that institutions restrict or enhance contracting possibilities.”
THE USE OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE (2014, background): “In fact, the goals of many public sector organizations are notoriously ambiguous (Burgess & Ratto, 2003; Dixit, 1997, 2002; Tirole, 1994), and the means-end relations are often ill-understood (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Kravchuk & Schack, 1996).”
Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector-Outsourcing Contracts (2005, background): “It is well-known that there are a number of unique characteristics which may attenuate the effects of high-powered incentives: the fact that there are multiple principals whose objectives may conflict and that there are multiple tasks whose quality is often difficult to measure, for instance (see D”
No Margin, no Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for public service delivery (2014, background): “In particular, to the extent that agents aremotivated by the externalities generated through pro-social tasks, this motivation may interact positively or negatively with extrinsic incentives (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Dixit, 2002).”