Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

By Tim Besley, Maitreesh Ghatak. 2005

1,370 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Public Administration, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c8a49e89fc0c86bf7362d2343b39e43f0ba890f2

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Citations in the corpus

Social Incentives in Organizations (2018, background): “Whilst identity is created once an individual joins an organization in Akerlof and Kranton (2010), in Besley and Ghatak (2005) it emerges as an equilibrium of the matching process between individuals and organizations, as individuals who care about a given mission sort into organizations that…”
Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action (2017, background): “Besley and McLaren (1993) used a model of tax collection and tax inspection to note that when punishment based on observed actions was sufficiently difficult (the probability of an effective audit with punishment was low) there was no advantage of paying a fixed wage high enough to deter corruption ”
The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, neutral): “π = b(1 + b) 1 + bR + P (bL − bR) k (30)”
Field experiments in labor economics (2010, background): “(2007) and Besley and Ghatak (2008). They emphasize that for status incentives to be effective, the positional good must be valued by employees, it must be scarce, and its allocation rule rewards the deserving.”
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task (2007, background): “Equation (3) contains several implicit assumptions.”
Crowding out intrinsic motivation in the public sector (2011, background): “Besley and Ghatak (2005) favor a sorting explanation, attributing the existence of a strong link We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.”
Do-gooders and go-getters: career incentives, selection, and performance in public service delivery (2014, background): “Recent theoretical contributions highlight that differences in pro-social preferences explain how individuals sort into mission-driven compared to profit-driven organizations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005).”
On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture) (2010, positive): “Homogeneity as an endogenous outcome (of sorting) has been derived independently by Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Van den Steen (2001, 2005b).”
Motivating Agents: How Much Does the Mission Matter? (2016, background): “Motivated by Besley and Ghatak (2005), agents with “mission preferences” receive utility increments from two sources if they work for the right principal (i.”