Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector-Outsourcing Contracts
By Paul H. Jensen, Robin Stonecash. 2005
177 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d72394d63a6ca2fa990833406e2fdef4cee13853
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Is Contracting out of Public Services still the Great Panacea? A Systematic Review of Studies on Economic and Quality Effects from 2000 to 2014 (2018, unknown): “In line with Hodge ( 2000 ) and Jensen and Stonecash ( 2005 ), we distinguish between privatization as sale of public assets (not our focus) and contracting out de fi ned as a temporary transfer of production responsibility to a private company (for-pro fi t or non-pro fi t) in return for economic…”
- Did New Public Management Matter? An empirical analysis of the outsourcing and decentralization effects on public sector size (2015, background): “Competition amongst potential public service suppliers will reduce costs and increase efficiencies, whilst eliminating public service provision of political interference (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005).”
- Incentive mechanism for inhibiting investors' opportunistic behavior in PPP projects (2016, background): “Jensen and Stonecash (2005) emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation in the outsourcing service incentives of public sectors.”