No Margin, no Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for public service delivery

By Nava Ashraf, O. Bandiera, B. Jack. 2014

425 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b882a91e7b41f8112d40c79df8b25e6af4338e63

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Citations in the corpus

Awards Unbundled: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2014, neutral): “Critically, we can show that in this context exam performance is correlated with future performance in the field (Ashraf et al., 2013b).”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, methodology): “Both the studies by Ashraf et al. (2015) and Deserranno (2015) provide examples of this approach. In the study by Ashraf et al. (2015), the authors used the two different recruitment strategies to create variation in the type of health promoters that were recruited.”
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (2020, background): “Studies in this growing literature have analyzed the role of incentives in the selection and performance of public sector workers (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016; Fisman and Wang, 2017; Deserranno, 2017; Khan et al., 2016; Bertrand et al., 2018; Khan et al., 2018), the”
Saving more in groups: Field experimental evidence from Chile (2018, background): “12 The results on the interest rate also contribute to the discussion of the relative impact of “social” or behavioral versus monetary incentives (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Ashraf et al., 2014; Chetty et al., 2014).”
Do-gooders and go-getters: career incentives, selection, and performance in public service delivery (2014, methodology): “Previous work has found dictator games adapted for specific beneficiary groups to be predictive of performance on pro-social tasks (Ashraf et al., 2013) and choices of public sector nurses to locate to rural areas (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2013).”
Striving for balance in economics : towards a theory of the social determination of behavior (2016, neutral): “2011, Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2014), and the references cited there and in World Bank Group 2015, chapter 2.”
Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda (2019, methodology): “In the recruitment experiment, these survey measures are complemented by a modified dictator game that has been shown to predict performance on prosocial tasks (e.g., Ashraf et al. 2014; Lagarde and Blaauw 2013).”
Profit with purpose? a theory of social enterprise with experimental evidence (2013, background): “This ties the paper to the growing literature on motivation and incentives (see, for example, Ashraf et al, 2014a,b, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, Benabou and Tirole, 2006, 2010 Besley and Ghatak, 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2010, Francois, 2000, and Kosfeld and von Siemens, 2011).”
Social Learning and Incentives for Experimentation and Communication (2018, methodology): “Our work relates to recent studies that promote new technologies through network “injection points”: Kremer et al., 2011; Ashraf et al., 2014; Leonard and Vasilaky, 2016; Beaman et al., 2015.”
Social Incentives in Organizations (2018, background): “An exception is Ashraf et al. (2014) who randomly allocate agents to incentive treatments and test whether the effect of these interacts with the agents’ social preferences, measured as described above.”
What's the right thing to do? Increasing pro-sociality with simple moral nudges (2017, neutral): “Columns (5) and (6) show that the “personal nudge” does not have a significant positive effect on PD cooperation (the effect, however, is close to marginally significant: both p’s<0.”