Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership

By John E. Core, David F. Larcker. 2002

362 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/138b77cc3ffafac146cda991aeaa414684a2b5e7

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Citations in the corpus

Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation (2006, neutral): “Researchers have also used different accounting measures of performance: return on equity (Baber et al., 1996; Lambert & Larcker, 1987), return on assets ( Core & Larcker, 2002; Sloan, 1993), and earnings per share (Core et al., 2003; Sloan, 1993).”
Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance (2008, methodology): “Our paper is related to studies that investigate the association of equity incentives and aggressive financial reporting, and to studies that document the costs of financial 1 Core and Larcker (2002) use an off-equilibrium setting in which firms adopt ownership target plans.”
Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe (2005, background): “Demsetz and Lehn (1985) are generally cited as a source of this argument and, confronting this issue, Core and Larcker (2002) use the impact of the adoption of mandatory share ownership plans for senior management to demonstrate a subsequent increase in firm performance.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “Equity incentives have been associated with better operating performance (Core and Larcker, 2002), more and better acquisitions (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Cai and Vijh, 2007), larger restructurings and layo¤s (Dial and Murphy, 1995; Brookman, Chang, and Rennie, 2007), and more voluntar”
Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “Core and Larcker (2002) attempt to reconcile the two views represented by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al.”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, positive): “Core and Larcker (2002) examined the effects of targeted ownership programs, which require executives to own minimum levels of firm stock. Their results showed that, although prior to plan adoption sample firms exhibited low levels of executive equity ownership and stock price performance, executive”
Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2007, neutral): “aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, Core and Larcker (2002) examine a sample of firms that adopt “target ownership plans”, and document increases in both managerial ownership and firm performance after plan adoption.”
Changes in insider ownership and changes in the market value of the firm (2008, neutral): “In those cases where managers do not own enough stock, boards may wish to consider targeted share ownership plans of the type studied by Core and Larcker (2002) .”