Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism

By Ryan Lafond, S. Roychowdhury. 2007

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a68010780fb44475841fbfd77d3d8e2f8107ebac

Citations in the corpus

• Gender Differences in Financial Reporting Decision-Making: Evidence from Accounting Conservatism (2015, unknown): “Following prior studies, such as Ahmed et al. (2002), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), we include the following firm-level control variables in our regressions: Log(Asset) - the natural log of total assets; Profitability - earnings before interest, taxes, and…”
• Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Dependence in Accounting Research (2010, unknown): “25 CGV, Liu and Wysocki (2007), and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.”
• Earnings Restatements and Differential Timeliness of Accounting Conservatism (2012, unknown): “Following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and LaFond and Watts (2008), we control for variation of conservatism due to firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and litigation risk.”
• The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market $ (2008, unknown): “9 By investigating the separation of ownership and control, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) find that to counter managers’ incentives to invest in or delay divestment of negative NPV projects, there is greater demand for conservatism when there is less alignment of interests between managers and…”
• The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis: THE EFFECT OF ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM (2016, unknown): “efficiency by constraining managers’ opportunistic behavior in the presence of information frictions (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; LaFond and Watts 2008).”
• Acquisition Profitability and Timely Loss Recognition (2010, unknown): “As such the incremental coefficient is appropriate to capture the degree of conservatism that counters managers’ incentives to overstate gains and understate losses (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008).”
• CEO Gender, Ethical Leadership, and Accounting Conservatism (2015, unknown): “Prior studies indicate that accounting conservatism effectively modulates moral hazard problems among managers, debtholders, and shareholders (Ahmed et al. 2002; Lafond and Roychowdhury 2008); helps in reducing information asymmetry (Hu et al.”
• The Adoption of IFRS 3: The Effects of Managerial Discretion and Stock Market Reactions (2011, unknown): “All accounting systems exhibit conservatism to some degree and there are known systematic variations across firms depending on institutional (e.g. Ball et al., 2000) and corporate governance factors (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Garcı́a Lara et al., 2007; 2008).”
• Does Accounting Quality Change Following a Switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS? Evidence from Germany (2012, unknown): “Prior research also finds that the market-to-book ratio can impact accounting conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Khan and Watts, 2009).”
• Corporate Suppliers and Customers and Accounting Conservatism (2012, unknown): “Furthermore, the timely recognition of bad news counters managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management (e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008).”
• Optimal Impairment Rules (2009, unknown): “In their empirical study LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) hypothesize that lower managerial ownership (higher α) gives rise to a more severe agency problem and an increased demand for conservative accounting.”
• The Benefits of Conservative Accounting to Shareholders: Evidence from the Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “are consistent with our expectations and prior studies, such as those by Mitton (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003). As Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) point out that BHAR is a better measure to explain crosssectional variation in firm performance, we further use BHAR as the dependent variable to capture”
• Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, unknown): “…studies suggest that greater managerial ownership has an entrenchment effect – controlling shareholders extrapolate private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders through accounting method choice (Smith, 1976; Dhaliwal et al., 1982) and less conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008).”