Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Synergies and Interrelationships
By Dima Jamali, Asem M. Safieddine, M. Rabbath. 2008
774 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/06f0c3b6bc1f03deb14f80eb3a528c9bcd2bc9ae
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- Lammertjan Dam
- Bert Scholtens
- Collins G. Ntim
- T. Soobaroyen
- Kwaku Opong
- Mohammad I. Jizi
- J. Danbolt
- Teng Lin
In Marketing
- Collins G. Ntim
- Lammertjan Dam
- T. Soobaroyen
- Benjamin A. Neville
- Mohammad I. Jizi
- J. Mahadeo
- vanisha Oogarah-Hanuman
- Ilan Alon
In Strategy and Management
- Collins G. Ntim
- T. Soobaroyen
- Lammertjan Dam
- Dima Jamali
- Mohammad I. Jizi
- Marc Fetscherin
- Benjamin A. Neville
- Bert Scholtens
Citations in the corpus
- Convergence Versus Divergence of CSR in Developing Countries: An Embedded Multi-Layered Institutional Lens (2011, background): “Rather CSR practices may have started to diffuse, and gained some acceptance, although consistent with the conceptualization of semiinstitutionalization by Kostova and Roth (2002), they have a relatively short history, a ‘‘fad’’ quality, and are not yet permanent/stable.”
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (2013, neutral): “Effective boards of directors are therefore expected to promote CSR reporting (Jamali et al. 2008).”
- Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations (2018, background): “…such as size and industry, drive corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Fifka, 2013), whilst a limited number of studies have investigated how ownership and board mechanisms affect CSR disclosures (Jamali et al., 2008; Reverte, 2009; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, b).”
- Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: The Role of Good Corporate Governance (2016, background): “CG and CSR are two concepts that have been studied separately in previous literature, (Bhimani and Soonawalla, 2005) and the relationships between the two generate beneficial synergies (Jamali et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2013).”
- The Effect of Corporate Governance Elements on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Disclosure: An Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies at KSE Pakistan (2015, background): “It is suggested that CG and CSR are two sides of the same coin as both CSR and CG motivate firms to perform their role towards the goodness of society [8].”
- Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries as an Emerging Field of Study (2018, neutral): “…excessive opportunism in CSR, given the institutional voids noted above, the influence of informal institutions may present countervailing pressures to conform to particular cultural norms or traditions such as Guanxi and Zakat (see Jamali et al. 2008; Moon and Shen 2010; Shafer et al. 2007).”
- Corporate Board and Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance: Evidence from China (2016, positive): “Previous studies have confirmed the positive relationship between the presence of independent directors and a firm’s socially responsible activities (O’Neill et al. 1989) and voluntary CSR disclosure (Jamali et al. 2008).”
- The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa (2012, positive): “…one on the CGSTAKE is positive, but statistically insignificant.8 This provides new evidence to support H3, as well as recent qualitative evidence (Jamali et al., 2008) and opinion-based survey (Starks, 2009) that indicate that institutional investors value disclosures on shareholder CG practices…”
- Outside Directors, Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis (2016, background): “There is also evidence which suggests that outside directors influence a firm’s CSR activities, excluding tax aggressiveness (e.g., Huang, 2010; Jamali et al., 2008).”