Ahmer Tarar
Sociology and Political Science · 2001–2006
A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 4 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Sociology and Political Science — 8 citations into it
- Economics and Econometrics — 7 citations into it
- Political Science and International Relations — 7 citations into it
Whom Ahmer Tarar trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
Papers from Ahmer Tarar's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Ahmer Tarar trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States (American Political Science Review)
- The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information (American Political Science Review)
- Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
- The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations (American Political Science Review)
- How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace
- BARGAINING THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
- The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition (International Organization)
- Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
- STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
- Bargaining and the Nature of War
Their papers
- Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War (2006) — 111 citations
- International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints (2001) — 121 citations