Ming-Wei Shih
Artificial Intelligence · 2016–2017
A researcher in the Science corpus: 3 papers; trusts 7 researchers and is trusted by 10 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Artificial Intelligence — 54 citations into it; #15,742 of 35,345 by trust here, #9,465 by citations
- Signal Processing — 39 citations into it
- Information Systems — 22 citations into it; #8,407 of 8,771 by trust here, #3,761 by citations
- Hardware and Architecture — 11 citations into it
- Privacy & Security — 11 citations into it
Whom Ming-Wei Shih trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Victor Costan
- Yuanzhong Xu
- Jonathan M. McCune
- Marcus Peinado
- Weidong Cui
- Rohit Sinha
- Srini Devadas
- Andrew Baumann
- Jaebaek Seo
- Ashay Rane
Who trusts Ming-Wei Shih overall
- Chia-che Tsai
- Ahmad Moghimi
- Guoxing Chen
- Marcus Hähnel
- Sangho Lee
- Jo Van Bulck
- Wenting Zheng
- Donald E. Porter
- Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea
- Florian Tramèr
Papers from Ming-Wei Shih's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Ming-Wei Shih trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
- Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
- TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
- Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization (European Conference on Computer Systems)
- Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy)
- Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy)
- T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs
- Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Isolation
- This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16).
- TrustZone : Integrated Hardware and Software Security
Their papers
- T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017) — 440 citations
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016) — 548 citations
- SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017) — 230 citations