This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16).

By Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas Knauth, André Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O'Keeffe, Mark Stillwell and 5 more

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX (2017, methodology): “Scone [5] and Panoply [54] build secure Linux containers using SGX.”
Chiron: Privacy-preserving Machine Learning as a Service (2018, background): “Haven [24], SCONE [22], and Graphene-SGX [29] provide an environment to support unmodiﬁed legacy applications.”
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, methodology): “[11] proposed to combine Docker containers with SGX to create secure containers.”
Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses (2017, background): “Furthermore, most works on applications of SGX suggest that it can be used to keep the code and data secret from any third party [5, 49, 63].”
SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, methodology): “Similar to other TEE runtime systems [8,95], SGX-LKL includes a libc implementation to support unmodiﬁed binaries that are dynamically linked against libc.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, methodology): “Graphene-SGX [45] – like other recently proposed SGX-based shielding systems including Haven [3], Panoply [41], and SCONE [2] – improves over this situation by not only protecting libOS instances from each other, but also from a malicious host operating system.”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, methodology): “Also, researchers implemented SGX layers [5, 6, 51, 57] to run existing applications inside an enclave without any modifications.”
Eleos: ExitLess OS Services for SGX Enclaves (2017, methodology): “Closestto our work, SCONE [9] leverages SGX to provide isolated execution for Linux containers [21].”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “…encouraged researchers and practitioners to develop various new applications to utilize these features ( e.g. , [2, 22, 51, 54, 59, 68, 69, 85, 88]), and new software tools or frameworks ( e.g. , [4, 5, 9, 24, 43, 50, 61, 65, 67, 72, 80]) to help developers adopt this emerging programming paradigm.”
SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017, methodology): “To reduce the TCB size of the libOS approach, Scone [9] suggests the container based sandbox in an enclave.”
EnclaveDB: A Secure Database Using SGX (2018, background): “To avoid the large TCB overhead of a whole library OS, SCONE [47] places the C standard library inside the enclave and delegates all system calls performed by the application to the untrusted host.”
Occlumency: Privacy-preserving Remote Deep-learning Inference Using SGX (2019, background): “As EPC paging involves heavy computation overhead due to encryption [21, 76], it causes a significant slowdown on the model inference running inside the enclave.”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, result): “We have obtained similar results with SPEC CPU2006 and four real-world case studies: SQLite, Memcached, Apache, and Nginx.”
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, methodology): “A Trade-offs in existing TEEs Haven [22] Graphene-SGX [31] I n t e l Scone [18] TrustZone [1] Komodo [41] OP-TEE [12] A R M Sanctuary [25] SEV [51] A M D SEV-ES [50] Sanctum [36] TIMBER-V [80] MultiZone [10] R I S C -”
A Berkeley View of Systems Challenges for AI (2017, background): “Another approach to ensure that code inside the enclave does not leak sensitive information is to develop static and dynamic verification tools as well as sandboxing [9, 12, 93].”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, background): “The Prime+Probe attack stages include: • Prime: in which the attacker fills the entire cache or a small portion of it with her own dummy data.”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, background): “Besides shielding systems [14, 15, 49], SGX has been used in specific applications or to address other security issues.”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, background): “For example, Haven [4], Graphene-SGX [61, 62], and SCONE [2] are SGX-based platforms to securely run an unmodified application in an untrusted cloud.”
DeepAttest: An End-to-End Attestation Framework for Deep Neural Networks (2019, methodology): “To evaluate DeepAttest on TEE-supported CPUs, we use SCONE [2], a secure container with Intel SGX [52] execution support.”