TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation

By Jonathan M. McCune, Yanlin Li, Ning Qu, Zongwei Zhou, Anupam Datta, Virgil D. Gligor, Adrian Perrig. 2010

649 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Information Systems

Citations in the corpus

Glimmers: Resolving the Privacy/Trust Quagmire (2017, background): “This has been a persistent problem with TEEs even from prior generations.”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “Some of these properties could also be achieved using trusted hypervisors [17], [28], [36], [38], [58], but trusted”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “A recent line of work has developed PMA security architectures that support secure isolated execution of protected modules with a minimal trusted computing base, either via a small hypervisor [31, 30, 42, 19], or with trusted hardware [29, 32, 11, 10, 34, 27].”
Intel SGX Explained (2016, methodology): “[136] proposes using a very small hypervisor together with Intel TXT’s dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) to implement trusted execution.”
Building Verifiable Trusted Path on Commodity x86 Computers (2012, methodology): “We implement a simple user-oriented trusted path as a case study.”
CloudVisor: retrofitting protection of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization (2011, background): “Enhancing Protection: A common problem exists in CloudVisor and other similar systems when trying to protect from a hostile service provider [15, 17, 71, 40], as the service provider (e.”
SMART: Secure and Minimal Architecture for (Establishing a Dynamic) Root of Trust (2012, background): “This was further extended into TrustVisor [28] which provides a dynamic root of trust for PALs directly from a minimal hypervisor.”
Komodo: Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software (2017, background): “However, the majority of these did not provide formal guarantees [e.g., 57, 58, 69].”
Privacy-Preserving Computation with Trusted Computing via Scramble-then-Compute (2017, background): “This trusted environment can be pro-visioned by either hardware (e.g. Intel SGX processors [1]) or hardware-software combination [26, 27].”
Outsourcing the Decryption of ABE Ciphertexts (2011, background): “McCune et al. recently proposed TrustVi-sor [31], a specialized hypervisor designed to protect and isolate security-sensitive “Pieces of Application Logic” (PALs) from less sensitive code.”
Cloud computing security: The scientific challenge, and a survey of solutions (2013, background): “TrustVisor [13] is another architecture by the same team, which is much more flexible, allowing the program p to include a full operating system (and therefore including software stacks for networking) running on a virtual machine, albeit at the cost of a larger TCB.”
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “, [30, 29]) are pervasive in PCs, they are not well-suited for low-end embedded devices due to their relatively high cost.”
Security issues in cloud environments: a survey (2014, background): “[164] built an hypervisor prototype with the main goal of executing self-contained securitysensitive code blocks.”
TrustLite: a security architecture for tiny embedded devices (2014, background): “Higher privilege modes can be used by a secure hypervisor or OS kernel to provide strong isolation of certain critical software modules [19, 25, 31, 33, 36, 40], assuming that sufficient attention is paid to reduce the complexity of the privileged secure OS or hypervisor [7, 21, 53].”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, methodology): “For example, Overshadow [7], NOVA [57], TrustVisor [43], Cloud Terminal [42], InkTag [21], MiniBox [37], and Sego [33] are TEEs based on trusted hypervisors.”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, methodology): “Li et al. [34] built a 2-way sandbox for x86 by separating the Native Client (NaCl) [55] sandbox into modules for sandboxing and service runtime to support application execution and use Trustvisor [39] to protect the piece of application logic from the untrusted OS.”
Security and privacy challenges in industrial Internet of Things (2015, methodology): “For these systems, a variety of security architectures have been proposed: software-based isolation and virtualization [35]; Trusted Computing based on secure hardware (e.g., Trusted Platform Module [67]); and processor architectures providing secure execution (e.g., ARM TrustZone [72], AEGIS [64],…”