SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs

By Jaebaek Seo, Byoungyoung Lee, Seong-Min Kim, Ming-Wei Shih, Insik Shin, Dongsu Han, Taesoo Kim. 2017

230 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Hardware and Architecture

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Citations in the corpus

Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “ the time when the attack is executed. Doing so requires certain amount of time, which motivated new approaches that consider periodic re-randomization performed at runtime [46]. Recently, Seo et al. [58] proposed SGX Shield framework that enables code randomization for SGX enclaves. While the prima”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, methodology): “SGX-Shield [46] enables Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in enclaves, with a scheme to maximize the entropy, and the ability to hide and enforce ASLR decisions.”
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX (2017, methodology): “SGXShield [33] implemented fine-grained ASLR when an enclave program is loaded into the SGX memory.”
POSTER: Rust SGX SDK: Towards Memory Safety in Intel SGX Enclave (2017, methodology): “Researchers have proposed several techniques for hardening Intel SGX [8, 11], but these solutions are only exploit mitigations.”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, background): “[47] enforce finegrained ASLR on enclave programs, which can raise the bar of exploiting any vulnerabilities and inferring control flow with page-fault sequences.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “SGX-Shield [38], on the other hand, implements fine-grained ASLR by compiling enclaved”
Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves (2017, background): “Research projects that adopt fine-grained ASLR on enclave programs such as SGXShield [31] would possibly mitigate Dark-ROP.”
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, methodology): “One approach to hinder Plundervolt-induced memory safety exploitation would be to randomize the enclave memory layout using systems like SGX-Shield [61].”
SGXBOUNDS: Memory Safety for Shielded Execution (2017, methodology): “Concurrent and independent from our work, SGX-Shield investigated the use of fine-grained ASR in the context of small enclaves [68].”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, background): “SGX-Shield [47] proposes protection by adding ASLR protection and introduces software diversity inside an enclave.”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, methodology): “Further, SGX-Shield [52] implements fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) for SGX.”
IRON: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX (2017, background): “Generic techniques for protection against enclave side channels are also under study in various works [38, 41, 49, 53, 58].”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, methodology): “, [6], [5], [73], [25], [77], [46], [88], [79], [71], [67], [54]) to help developers adopt this emerging programming paradigm.”