Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven

By Andrew Baumann, Marcus Peinado, Galen C. Hunt. 2014

871 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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Citations in the corpus

Machine Learning Models that Remember Too Much (2017, background): “Advances in data analytics frameworks based on trusted hardware such as SGX [7, 61, 66] and cryptographic protocols based on secure multi-party computation (see Section 8) may also serve as the basis for secure ML platforms.”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “By comparison, recent work [9] proposes loading a library variant of Windows 8 together with an application into an SGX-isolated region; this allows running unmodified Windows • We design and implement efficient, compiler-based, region-write-integrity and region-read-write-integrity invariants for…”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, methodology): “Besides shielding systems [14, 15, 49], SGX has been used in specific applications or to address other security issues.”
Detecting Privileged Side-Channel Attacks in Shielded Execution with Déjà Vu (2017, background): “To reduce the trusted computing base of sensitive applications, numerous eﬀorts have proposed systems to support shielded execution —i.e., application program execution for which the conﬁdentiality and integrity is protected from an untrusted operating system ( e.g. , [37, 10, 22, 7]).”
SOCK: Rapid Task Provisioning with Serverless-Optimized Containers (2018, background): “Recent alternatives to traditional containerization are based on library operating systems, enclaves, and unikernels [7, 24, 29, 31, 41, 42].”
Observing and Preventing Leakage in MapReduce (2015, background): “Haven [5] can run databases on a single machine.”
Moat: Verifying Confidentiality of Enclave Programs (2015, background): “Haven [10] is a system that exploits Intel SGX for shielded execution of unmodiﬁed Windows applications.”
Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves (2017, background): “This result strongly suggests that SGX research should focus more on traditional security mitigations rather than on making enclave development more convenient by expanding the trusted computing base and the attack surface (e.g., Graphene, Haven).”
Cache Attacks on Intel SGX (2017, methodology): “The execution system Haven [2] was designed to securely run unmodified legacy applications on an unmodified cloud operating system to provide applications with the protection of SGX without adaptation.”
High-Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2017, methodology): “We assume that at least some parts of the application binaries are public, either because they belong to unmodified legacy applications [9,14,27,44] or because they are a part of a public application platform [39].”
Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Support for Dynamic Memory Management Inside an Enclave (2016, background): “Library OSes provide a new type of container where an application is bundled with an OS runtime that executes in user level (ring 3) [7] A critical requirement for SGX enabled library OSes is to provide secure exception handling.”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, background): “CONTROLLED-CHANNEL ATTACK REVISITED In this section, we briefly explain the controlled-channel attack [65] (called pigeonhole attack in [54]) that allows a malicious OS to infer sensitive computation and data inside a TEE such as Haven [4] and InkTag [21].”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, methodology): “Also, researchers implemented SGX layers [5, 6, 51, 57] to run existing applications inside an enclave without any modifications.”
Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016, background): “Researchers have demonstrated applications including enclave execution of legacy (non-SGX) code [10] and use of SGX in a distributed setting for map-reduce computations [32].”
Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “Potential applications are numerous, ranging from cloud computing [11, 28, 50, 61, 62], mobile security [60], web security, to cryptocurrencies [74].”
CQSTR: Securing Cross-Tenant Applications with Cloud Containers (2016, background): “VC3 [51] and Haven [26] use SGX to ensure private data is not released to untrusted components (i.e., the programming framework, hypervisor or OS).”
AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves (2016, methodology): “Furthermore, Haven tries to defend against Iago attacks be sanitising and checking the parameters of Ecalls and results of Ocalls.”
Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, methodology): “The question immediately arises: Is this weaker model of trusted hardware useful? Many prior works have proposed using trusted hardware for secure outsourcing of computations, including protection of cryptographic keys (Flicker) [18], Digital Rights Management (Aegis) [16], Map-Reduce jobs (M(2)R) [”
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “Even cache disabling during enclave execution only might be prohibitively expensive, given that enclaves may need to process large datasets (e.g., human DNA), perform expensive computation (e.g., cryptography), or run large applications [5].”