T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs

By Ming-Wei Shih, Sangho Lee, Taesoo Kim, Marcus Peinado. 2017

440 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Information Systems

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Citations in the corpus

Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “Mitigations for these side-channel attacks are being developed (Shinde et al., 2016; Shih et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Intel Corp., 2018) but a truly secure solution might require some architectural changes, e.g., as in the proposed Sanctum processor (Costan et al., 2016).”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, methodology): “ther, researchers have recently proposed countermeasures against the attack such as balanced-execution-based design [50] and user-space page-fault detection [10, 49, 50].”
This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (neutral): “System calls in the application transfer con-trol to the NaCl runtime which determines the proper action.”
Opaque: An Oblivious and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform (2017, methodology): “This parameter can range from as small as the registers (plus Opaque’s enclave code size) to as large as the entire EPC [8, 35] or main memory.”
SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs (2017, background): “[54] is too expensive in practice (4000 times without developer’s help), T-SGX [53] suggests a defense based on Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) to hide page faults against the untrusted kernel.”
Komodo: Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software (2017, background): “Mitigations exist, but (at a minimum) they require recompilation of enclave code, prevent use of dynamic paging, and carry a high performance cost [77, 78].”
A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses (2018, background): “Likewise, for Intel SGX technology, remote attestation schemes have been developed [81] to enforce that a victim enclave can only be run exactly once.”
Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks (2018, background): “In particular, Wang et al. [56] showed that it is possible to bypass existing defenses [51] against controlled channel attacks [58] by ﬂushing the TLB to force page table walks without trapping SGX enclaves.”
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX (2017, methodology): “ important because the anomalously high AEX interrupt rate has been considered to be a key feature of SGX side-channel attacks, which can be defeated by the protection designed to capture this signal [15, 38]. Our finding, however, shows that such interrupt-based protection is fragile, as more sophi”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, methodology): “Page fault side channels are effective on SGX and can be defeated using software solutions [49] or by exploiting Intel Transactional Syn-chronization Extensions (TSX) [48].”
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, background): “ware defenses to strengthen the security guarantees of Intel SGX enclaves [51, 60, 61].”
hPRESS: A Hardware-Enhanced Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Using Secure Enclave (2020, background): “Side-channel attacks remain a threat to SGX although researchers have present several solutions to make SGX resistant to side-channel attacks, such as involving ORAM [8] or Intel TSX [9].”