Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization

By Jonathan M. McCune, Bryan Parno, Adrian Perrig, Michael K. Reiter, Hiroshi Isozaki. European Conference on Computer Systems, 2008

792 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d2a20b1f076515a180c7736f242990f0adcb5855

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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Citations in the corpus

HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity (2010, background): “They have been leveraged to provide secure loading (with the guaranteed load-time integrity) [49], [32], integrity measurement [39], [22], and attestation [41], [42], [45].”
Efficient Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (2013, background): “, to run a small software component in an isolated way [33].”
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, background): “Several other TEEs explore design at layers such as hypervisors [34, 45, 61], physical memory [30, 57, 62], virtual memory [25, 37, 80], and process isolation [38, 76, 86, 87].”
Making argument systems for outsourced computation practical (sometimes) (2012, background): “Other attestation work requires a trusted base [5, 54].”
Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions (2013, background): “Recognizing the challenges presented by the need to trust a full operating system, CMU’s Flicker [8] loads a simple hosting environment, reported to be as little as 250 lines of code that executed with the primary operating system suspended.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, methodology): “targets small, secure applications or application fragments that are especially written for a small-TCB environment [38], [37], [35], [45].”
Innovative Technology for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing (2013, methodology): “To overcome this problem Intel has introduced an extension to the Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme used by the TPM [5] &[6] called Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)[7] that is used by the Quoting Enclave to sign enclave attestations.”
Cloud computing security: The scientific challenge, and a survey of solutions (2013, background): “Flicker [12] is a low-level architecture that achieves that, but only for small and short-lived programs running in impoverished environments (e.g., with basic input-output that excludes interaction with users or on the network).”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “The Flicker [39] approach uses TXT [31] and avoids using a trusted hypervisor by time-partitioning the host machine between trusted and untrusted operation.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “A recent line of work has developed PMA security architectures that support secure isolated execution of protected modules with a minimal trusted computing base, either via a small hypervisor [31, 30, 42, 19], or with trusted hardware [29, 32, 11, 10, 34, 27].”
M2R: Enabling Stronger Privacy in MapReduce Computation (2015, methodology): “Previous works have successfully demonstrated how to securely execute a unit of user-deﬁned computation on an untrusted cloud node, us-ing support from hardware primitives available in commodity CPUs [8,14,38,39,49] .”
Verifying computations without reexecuting them (2015, background): “Still other solutions involve trusted hardware [19, 49] or attestation [40, 45, 50], but these mechanisms require a chain of trust and assumptions that the hardware or a hypervisor works correctly.”
Building Verifiable Trusted Path on Commodity x86 Computers (2012, background): “Recent research has demonstrated removing the OS from the TCB for small code modules [6, 43, 44, 57].”
Privacy-Preserving Computation with Trusted Computing via Scramble-then-Compute (2017, background): “, IBM 4767 PCIeCC2 [3], Intel SGX [4]) or hardwaresoftware combination [34, 35].”
Komodo: Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software (2017, background): “However, the majority of these did not provide formal guarantees [e.g., 57, 58, 69].”
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs (2017, methodology): “Flicker [44] and TrustVisor [43] use trusted hardware (TPM [60]) and attempt to minimize the complexity of their TEE software.”
Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets (2016, background): “Many systems guarantee secure execution of processes in presence of un-trusted OSes, either at the hardware or software level.”
Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation (2009, methodology): “, Flicker [15]), whereas TrustVisor executes the HV-family of trusted computing operations on the platform’s primary CPU, and uses efficient symmetric primitives for HV Seal and HV Unseal.”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, methodology): “The first, taken by Flicker [38], is to time-”