Roland Strausz

Economics and Econometrics · 2001–2017

A researcher in the Science corpus: 4 papers; trusts 9 researchers and is trusted by 7 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 15 citations into it; #10,200 of 23,481 by trust here, #13,168 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 11 citations into it; #6,517 of 11,946 by trust here, #6,314 by citations
• Marketing — 8 citations into it
• Management Information Systems — 7 citations into it; #2,213 of 3,376 by trust here, #2,987 by citations
• Accounting — 6 citations into it

Whom Roland Strausz trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Ethan Mollick
2. Paul Belleflamme
3. Min Ding
4. Jordana Viotto da Cruz
5. Venkat Kuppuswamy
6. Ajay Agrawal
7. Andrea Ordanini
8. Thomas Lambert

Who trusts Roland Strausz overall

1. Pepa Kraft
2. Heski Bar-Isaac
3. Rotem Shneor
4. Jordana Viotto da Cruz
5. Mary Kay Gugerty
6. Joel Shapiro

Papers from Roland Strausz's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Roland Strausz trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: Determinants of Success and Failure
2. The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study
3. Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd (Social Science Research Network)
4. Optimal Auction Design
5. Crowd-Funding: Transforming Customers into Investors through Innovative Service Platforms
6. Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding (Innovation Policy and the Economy)
7. Job Market Signaling
8. Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation
9. Putting Auction Theory to Work
10. Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly (Journal of Economics Theory)

Their papers

• Honest certification and the threat of capture (2005) — 129 citations
• A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard (2017) — 334 citations
• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design (2015) — 379 citations
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case (2001) — 295 citations