Honest certification and the threat of capture

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Ratings Quality Over the Business Cycle (2013, background): “…equilibrium where the CRA tells the truth in every period exists and demonstrate that truthtelling incentives are weaker when the CRA has more business from rating complex products.4 Strausz (2005) is similar in structure to Mathis et al. (2009), but examines information intermediaries in general.”
Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts (2015, unknown): “Shapiro (1983), Strausz (2005)) or due to concerns about outside political intervention (Beaver”
A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard (2017, background): “Suggested Citation: Strausz, Roland (2016) : A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard, CESifo Working Paper, No.”
Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation (2013, unknown): “Whereas Strausz (2005), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Diamond (1984) predict that certification providers are essentially natural monopolists, Lizzeri (1999) finds the opposite effect.”