Michael H. Rothkopf

Management Science and Operations Research · 2003–2005

A researcher in the Science corpus: 3 papers; trusts 1 researcher and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 8 citations into it
• Marketing — 7 citations into it

Whom Michael H. Rothkopf trusts

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Noam Nisan (in Management Science and Operations Research)

Papers from Michael H. Rothkopf's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Michael H. Rothkopf trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
3. The assignment game I: The core
4. The Package Assignment Model (Journal of Economics Theory)
5. Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (INFORMS journal on computing)
6. An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry
7. Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities (European Journal of Operational Research)
8. Optimal Auction Design
9. Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling (Games Econ. Behav.)
10. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)

Their papers

• Dispatchable transmission in RTO markets (2005) — 170 citations
• Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities (2005) — 452 citations
• Combinatorial auction design (2003) — 524 citations