The assignment game I: The core

By Lloyd S. Shapley, M. Shubik. 1971

Subfields: Game & Decision Theory, Pure Mathematics

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Citations in the corpus

The Package Assignment Model (2002, methodology): “The Package Assignment Model by Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph M. Ostroy May 1998”
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017, methodology): “We solve for this allocation following Shapley and Shubik (1971). Specifically, we solve the following linear program:”
How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-Sided Matching Model of Venture Capital (2007, unknown): “An alternative model with fully transferable utility is the Assignment model (Shapley and Shubik (1972)).”
Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (2013, unknown): “To illustrate the reasoning behind this result, consider the matching shown in Figure 1, which is not assortative.”
Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities (2005, background): “Additional relevant research stems from Shapley and Shubik (1972) and their discussion of assignment markets.”
Towards a theory of mutual mate choice: Lessons from two-sided matching (2000, background): “…upon Gale and Shapley’s work, extending their theoretical framework while applying two-sided matching theory to problems ranging from labour markets (Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Crawford and Knoer, 1981; Kelso and Crawford, 1982; Roth, 1982, 1984, 1990, 1991) to human courtship and marriage (Knuth,…”
On a characterization of stable matchings (2000, background): “One attractive question that remains to be answered is whether a similar characterization is possible for the assignment games studied by Shapley and Shubik (1972).”
Personality Traits and the Marriage Market (2014, background): “Shapley and Shubik (1972) have shown that the equilibrium matching π maximizes the total utility”
Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness (2007, methodology): “A standard tool in economic approaches to matching or hedonic problems is the Spence-Mirrlees condition—also known as the twist condition in the mathematics literature (Villani 2009). Though the Spence-Mirrlees condition has been generalized to multidimensional type spaces—see Gangbo (1995), Carlier”
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, background): “In many canonical games, the nature of the defined value for the game can be explored for showing the non-emptiness of the core; this is done in many applications, such as [323], where information-theoretical properties are used; [191], where network properties are used; as well as [42, 447], where ”