Orhan Aygün

Economics and Econometrics · 2013

A researcher in the Science corpus: 1 paper; trusts 5 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom Orhan Aygün trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. John William Hatfield
  2. Paul R. Milgrom
  3. Lloyd S. Shapley
  4. Tamás Fleiner
  5. Tayfun Sönmez

Who trusts Orhan Aygün overall

  1. John William Hatfield
  2. Federico Echenique
  3. Scott Duke Kominers
  4. Tayfun Sönmez

Papers from Orhan Aygün's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Orhan Aygün trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Matching with Contracts
  2. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
  3. A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications (Mathematics of Operations Research)
  4. A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
  5. Supplement to: Core Many-to-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods
  6. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
  7. Combinatorial auction design (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America)
  8. Collective Choice and Social Welfare
  9. Putting Auction Theory to Work
  10. The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

Their papers