A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure

By A. Alkan. 2002

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, background): “41More specifically, the former result holds under the property called the substitute condition, and the latter under the substitute condition and another property called the law of aggregate demand or size (or cardinal) monotonicity (Alkan, 2002; Alkan and Gale, 2003).”
Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016, background): “Alkan & Gale (2003) consider a stable allocation model that extends the stable matching model of Alkan (2002).”
How to Control Controlled School Choice (2015, unknown): “This property was ﬁrst introduced in Alkan (2002) and Alkan and Gale (2003) for matching markets without transfers (or contracts), and by Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) for markets with contracts.”
A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2004, background): “Alkan (2001, 2002) presents properties (including distributivity) of the lattice structure on pairwise-stable matchings, in many-to-many markets with additional structure on preferences.”
Matching with Contracts: Comment (2013, background): “These papers include Alkan (2002), Alkan and Gale (2003), and Fleiner (2003).”