Collective Choice and Social Welfare
By Amartya Sen. 2017
3,239 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus philosophical aspects from ethics and the theory of justice.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations
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In Political Science and International Relations
- G. MacKerron
- K. Basu
- Maarten Franssen
- M. Grasso
- Enrique Herrera-Viedma
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- Olof Johansson-Stenman
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Citations in the corpus
- On the Evaluation of Economic Mobility (2001, background): “The fact that ”intermediate phases of randomization” do not matter for expected utility is an important part of Diamond (1967)’s classic criticism of expected utility as a foundation for ethical preferences (see the discussion in Sen, 1970, pp.142-145). for society.”
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that every instance I of hr admits at least one stable matching.”
- Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice (2002, background): “Various information assumptions that can be expressed in terms of admissible transformations have been considered in contributions by Blackorby and Donaldson (1982), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984), d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), De Meyer and Plott (1971), Dixit (1980), Gevers (1979), Robert”
- On the Robustness of Majority Rule (2008, background): “4 Our formulation of neutrality (see section 3)—which is, in fact, the standard formulation (see Sen, 1970”
- Rationalizability of Choice Functions: Domain Conditions (2012, neutral): “See: Sen(1970).”
- Econophysics review: II. Agent-based models (2011, neutral): “However, as Sen ( 1971 ) notes, an economy can be Pareto-optimal , yet still ‘ perfectly disgusting ’ by any ethical standards .”
- Integrating multiplicative preference relations in a multipurpose decision-making model based on fuzzy preference relations (2001, neutral): “This topic has been widely studied [2,8,11,21,23].”
- Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability (2002, background): “Quite some years before these developments, Sen (1970) opened several paths branching out of Arrow’s trail.”