J. Laffont
Economics and Econometrics · 2000–2008
A researcher in the Science corpus: 12 papers; trusts 8 researchers and is trusted by 15 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Economics and Econometrics — 27 citations into it; #4,706 of 23,481 by trust here, #5,336 by citations
- Strategy and Management — 22 citations into it; #6,281 of 10,874 by trust here, #5,089 by citations
- Management Science and Operations Research — 15 citations into it; #1,968 of 11,946 by trust here, #1,269 by citations
- Gender Studies — 5 citations into it
Whom J. Laffont trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- J. Guasch
- Clive G. Harris
- Roger B. Myerson
- Bruno Jullien
- Ilya Segal
- Joshua D. Angrist
- S. Rose-Ackerman
- Jean-Charles Rochet
- Marcel Fafchamps
Who trusts J. Laffont overall
- Stéphane Straub
- J. Guasch
- Antonio Estache
- Giuseppe Munda
- Toke S. Aidt
- J. Rud
- Dilip Mookherjee
- J. Azam
- Jean Tirole
- Mark Armstrong
Papers from J. Laffont's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers J. Laffont trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right
- Regulatory Effectiveness: The Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Governance Arrangements on Electricity Industry Outcomes
- Incentives and political economy
- Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation
- An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America
- Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation
- Job Market Signaling
- Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy* (Economic development and cultural change)
- Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach
Their papers
- Incentives and political economy (2000) — 295 citations
- Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (2000) — 340 citations
- Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America (2003) — 315 citations
- Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors (2008) — 291 citations
- Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation (2007) — 234 citations
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003) — 230 citations
- Contracting for aid (2003) — 250 citations
- Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach (2006) — 128 citations
- Regulation and Development: References (2005) — 287 citations
- On the Receiver Pays Principle (2003) — 169 citations
- Public economics yesterday, today and tomorrow (2002) — 26 citations
- The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001) — 1,670 citations