Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
By Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars A. Stole. 2002
435 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aaf423c0728cb2d6509143646fe5afaf48c028a2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Lars A. Stole
- Michael Grubb
- Wouter Dessein
- Mark Armstrong
- Gregory Pavlov
- Matthew Osborne
- John Vickers
- Christopher S. Tang
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Lars A. Stole
- Gregory Pavlov
- Michael Grubb
- Estelle Cantillon
- John Asker
- Mark Armstrong
- Wouter Dessein
- David Martimort
In Marketing
- Lars A. Stole
- Michael Grubb
- Wouter Dessein
- Mark Armstrong
- Gregory Pavlov
- John Vickers
- Matthew Osborne
- Christopher S. Tang
Citations in the corpus
- Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “Rochet and Stole (2002) considered a competitive screening model with firms differentiated as in Hotelling (1929), where there is no adverse selection.”
- Competitive Non-linear Pricing and Bundling (2009, background): “See, for example, Stevens (2004). (2)Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2006) are recent surveys.”
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods (2011, methodology): “u (θ2) = { u (c) + β (θ2 − c) u (c) + β (θ2 − c) + (θ2 − θ2) if if θ2 ∈ [c, θ2) θ2 ∈ (θ2, c+ 1] (18)”
- Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets (2017, background): “Following Rochet and Stole (2002) and White and Weyl (2016), we assume that at symmetric prices, each firm receives a sample of consumers with costs that are representative of all consumers purchasing the product and that a firm that cuts its price steals consumers with a similarly representative…”
- Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry (2004, background): “Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995) allow the agent’s reservation utility to depend on his type, while Rochet and Stole (2002) consider agents with random reservation utilities.”
- The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001, background): “Malcomson and Spinnewin (1988), Rogerson (1985b) and Lambert (1983) have all shown that the optimal long-term contract exhibits memory.”
- Network competition in nonlinear pricing (2003, result): “For an access charge equal to the marginal cost of terminating a call, a = c0, my model is identical to those of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002).”
- Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation (2015, background): “10See Rochet and Stole (2002) for an insightful discussion of this assumption.”
- Price Discrimination and Competition (2007, methodology): “Several papers have taken this approach in one form or another, including Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999), Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002).”