Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

By America, J. Guasch, J. Laffont, Stéphane Straub, J. Azam, J. Berthelemy, Philip Bondt, Soumyadip Chattopadhyay, J. Cŕemer, Pierre Dubois and 11 more. 2003

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6879c5249da97035850b375522a5a3a511f67099

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. J. Guasch
2. Stéphane Straub
3. Michael Pollitt
4. Scott Wallsten
5. J. Marion
6. Ricard Gil
7. George R. G. Clarke
8. Thorsten Beck

In Finance

1. J. Guasch
2. J. Laffont
3. Stéphane Straub
4. Michael Pollitt
5. George R. G. Clarke
6. Thorsten Beck
7. P. Joskow
8. Sebastian Galiani

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Stéphane Straub
2. J. Guasch
3. J. Laffont
4. Michael Pollitt
5. J. Marion
6. Ricard Gil
7. Maria Fay
8. P. Joskow

Citations in the corpus

• Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach (2006, methodology): “4 This model was summarized in reduced form in Guasch et al. (2003) .”
• Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature (2008, background): “Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003 and 2006) have”
• Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America (2004, background): “For example, two recent studies, Harris et al. (2003) and Guasch et al (2003), have looked at contract cancellations and renegotiations.”
• Evaluating the evidence on electricity reform: Lessons for the South East Europe (SEE) market (2009, background): “Guasch et al. (2003) further find that concession contracts – including in the electricity sector – in Latin America were less likely to be renegotiated if a regulator was in place at the time of contracting.”
• Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement (2013, background): “Klein and Leffler (1981) were among the earliest contributors on this topic followed by others, such asBull (1987), Klein and Murphy(1988), Baker et al.(1994), Klein (1996), and more recentlyBoard (2008) and Halac (2008).”
• Regulatory Effectiveness: The Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Governance Arrangements on Electricity Industry Outcomes (2005, unknown): “Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2002) Gutierrez (2003) and Pargal (2003) for good recent examples.”
• Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key Challenges (2006, background): “Hulten (1996) finds that differences in the effective use of infrastructure resources explain one-quarter of the growth differential between Africa and East Asia, and more than 40 percent of the growth differential between low- and high-growth countries.”