An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America

By Scott Wallsten. 2001

489 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc2cf780077e347f3f62444bd63b9233d38ab69f

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Citations in the corpus

Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Does Regulation Make a Difference? (2004, background): “…on the impact of utilities regulation in developing countries is still limited, but studies for telecommunications and electricity industries confirm that privatization brings greater benefits when it is accompanied by an effective regulatory regime (Wallsten, 2001; Zhang et al., 2003a, 2003b).”
Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation (2008, methodology): “Studies by Wallsten (2001), Gutierrez and Berg (2000) and Bortolotti et al. (2002) of telecommunications across a number of countries report similarly that privatisation alone is associated with few performance improvements and that effective regulation and competition are important.”
Determinants of a Digital Divide in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Cell Phone Coverage (2008, background): “…from full competition to singleprovider state-run companies on levels of mobile penetration and/or prices and service quality (Frempong and Atubra, 2001; Gebreab, 2002; Mureithi,2003; Stovring, 2004; Varoudakis and Rossotto, 2004; Wheeler, Dasgupta, and Lall, 2001; Ibarguen, 2003; Wallsten, 2001).”
Has Private Participation in Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence from Latin America (2004, background): “Recent studies include Li and Xu (2002), Petrazzini (1996), Ros (1999), and Wallsten (2001).”
The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes (2004, unknown): “Fink et al. (2002), Wallsten (2001, 2002) , Bortolotti et al. (2001), Gutierrez and Berg (2000) and Ros (2003) each employ a simple dummy variable—such as whether a country has a separate regulatory agency not directly under the control of the ministry—to attempt to capture regulatory independence.”
New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications (2015, background): “To be sure, effective regulation should also positively affect the model of pure private ownership; privatization without effective regulation can lead to excessive monopoly rents and even low quality in important service dimensions (Wallsten, 2001).”
Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation (2007, background): “Wooldridge (2002) shows that the 2SLS standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically valid and that the IV estimator from such an estimation is asymptotically efficient.”
Remittances and Development: Lessons from Latin America (2008, background): “Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Wallsten (2001) and International Telecommunication Union (2006). Note: In some countries, the year of entrance of the second and the third operator corresponds to the year when a second (or a third operator) entered into the same market as the incumbent.”
Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms (2002, unknown): “And, as discussed above, a growing body of literature has demonstrated that where competition has developed (almost always from new wireless entrants), it brings about dramatic improvements in countries' telecommunications networks sector (Li and Xu 2001;Petrazzini 1996a;Ros 1999;Wallsten 2001a).”
The Political Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecommunications Sector (2002, background): “These indicators have implications for the demand (and therefore supply) of 15 telecommunications reforms.”
Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities (2004, unknown): “Since utility privatization is often associated with an increase in investment and a large expansion of capacity (Li and Xu, 2001, Ros, 1999, Wallsten, 2001), it should reduce bribe payments by reducing capacity constraints.”
Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance (2012, unknown): “For instance, examining events of telecom privatization in Africa and Latin America, Wallsten (2001) observes that while privatization in tandem with effective regulatory systems appear to improve a host of service performance dimensions, privatization alone results in lower service penetration to t”
Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter? (2005, background): “The earliest reforms in the utilities occurred in telecommunications and much research has focused on this sector (e.g. Noll, 2000; Wallsten, 2001; Li and Xu; 2002; Gutierrez, 2003).”