The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

By J. Laffont, David Martimort. 2001

1,670 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4c19077c09a65a61ce75ef34e409f43f315126a

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Citations in the corpus

Knowledge Production and Contradictory Functions in African Higher Education (2015, background): “…are also included because they are both large, well-known African universities that have intentions and policies to become research-led institutions, but that are grappling with trading off enrolment expansion with a focus on the doctorate and research, albeit with somewhat different outcomes.”
A Review on Bilevel Optimization: From Classical to Evolutionary Approaches and Applications (2017, background): “9) Principal–Agent Problems: Principal–agent problem [98] is a classical problem in economics, where a principal (leader) subcontracts a job to an agent (follower).”
The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa (2007, background): “Whenever a lead actor, or principal, designates another actor, an agent, to advance certain goals on their behalf, a number of conditions can impede effective coordination and oversight.(21) In the case of China’s Africa policy, three such conditions stand out.”
Payments for Environmental Services and Motivation Crowding: Towards a Conceptual Framework (2019, background): “In other words, ecosystem service “providers” should behave as rational actors who calculate the benefits and costs of conservation versus other alternative land-use options and act upon accordingly (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).”
Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003, background): “Observability has implications for monitoring and enforcement of contracts and their subsequent incentive effects on agents’ behaviour (Laffont and Martimort 2002).”
Foreign Entry and Bank Competition (2006, background): “This involves the entrant o¤ering a shutdown contract that is accepted only by the e¢ cient agent (low-risk borrower), but rejected by his ine¢ cient counterpart (La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, p. 38).”
Feudal Multi-Agent Hierarchies for Cooperative Reinforcement Learning (2019, background): “A more complete range of possibilities for creating and decomposing rewards between managers and workers when the objectives of the two are not perfectly aligned, could usefully be studied under the aegis of principal-agent problems [12, 15].”
How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? (2018, background): “These models provide some inspiration for ours; in particular, they are often formalized such that the agent’s actions are “effort variables” which, at some cost to the agent, increase the agent’s level of “production” [28].”