Asset restructuring and business group affiliation in French civil law countries

By R. Hoskisson, Albert A. Cannella, Laszlo Tihanyi, Rosario Faraci. 2004

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f954f366d631381985c9dea2a54a960a7e16d281

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Citations in the corpus

Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, methodology): “A second theoretical contribution lies in the identification that the benefits and costs of family ownership and control vary systematically according to the level of legal and Table 9 Study 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations.”
Organizational Responses to Environmental Demands: Opening the Black Box (2008, background): “From our total sample of 3,160 facilities, this 17 percent response rate is comparable to other recent survey-based strategy research (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2004; McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002; Slater and Olson, 2001).”
Business groups in developing capital markets: Towards a complementarity perspective (2015, background): “widely referred to as the institutional voids perspective, it was adopted by a number of scholars seeking to explain the prevalence of business groups and their strategies (Chang and Hong, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2004; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).”
Does the Diversification–Firm Performance Relationship Change Over Time? A Meta‐Analytical Review (2018, unknown): “For five studies which did not report the time period of their observations (Hoskisson et al., 2004; Mackey and Barney, 2013; Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Oyewobi et al., 2013; Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005), we used the year three years prior to the publication date.”
An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities (2008, unknown): “To explore the effectiveness of information disclosure as a corporate governance practice, we draw on two stylized cases from the Latin model of corporate governance (Rhodes and van Apeldoorn 1997; Aguilera 2003; Goyer 2003; Hoskisson et al. 2004; Trento 2005).”
Diversified Business Groups and Corporate Refocusing in Emerging Economies (2005, background): “Family ownership of diversified business groups is prominent in many emerging economies across Latin America ( Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004 ), Taiwan (Chung, 2001), India (Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002), and elsewhere.”
Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments (2009, background): “…2000), management researchers increasingly argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms may differ from country to country and may be mediated by institutional characteristics of a particular economic system (Dharwakar et al., 2000; Douma et al., 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2004).”
Resource-Based Theory and Corporate Diversification (2011, methodology): “For example, using transaction cost economics as a base, as market institutions mature and improve, business groups should restructure to become less diversified (Hoskisson et al., 2004).”
Beyond institutional voids: Business groups, incomplete markets, and organizational form (2015, background): “The unfolding of pro-market reforms in emerging economies is accompanied by a burst of growth opportunities in the external environment (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009a; Hoskisson et al., 2004).”
The research frontier in corporate governance (2011, background): “Building on pioneering work within the law and economics field (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, 2000), management researchers increasingly argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms may differ from country to country and is moderated by institutional characteristics of a particular ”
Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, background): “Specifically, pyramid firms can gain access to other pyramid firms’ resources (Hoskisson et al., 2003) and share the group’s reputation capital (Chang and Hong, 2000; Ma et al.”