Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments

By Garry D. Bruton, Igor Filatotchev, Salim Chahine, Mike Wright. 2009

400 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3ad2dfbb70762bb4c9fd272c5ca40e3def9286d4

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Citations in the corpus

Contextualization and the advancement of entrepreneurship research (2014, background): “…of alignment between ownership and control, giving rise not only to principal–agent problems, but also multiple principal (such as through pyramidal ownership structures in emerging economies; see Peng and Sauerwald, 2013) and multiple agency conflicts (such as in IPOs, see Bruton et al., 2010).”
Corporate Governance and Investors' Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective (2014, methodology): “Researchers have identified private equity investors, such as VCs, as important external monitors in IPO firms (Bruton et al., 2010).”
Ownership structure and innovation: An emerging market perspective (2013, background): “Such a highly bureaucratic and corrupt legal-political governance allows government officials to misuse political power (Bruton et al., 2010; Khanna & Palepu, 1997) and behave opportunistically against firms (North, 1990), thus creating uncertain “political markets” for firms to secure government su”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “, 2011; Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2012; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), industry context (Chancharat, Krishnamurti & Tian, 2012), ownership structure (Bruton et al., 2010; Desender et al., 2012), and a firm’s financial condition and stage in its life-cycle (Dowell, Shackell & Stuart, 2011).”
The research frontier in corporate governance (2011, background): “More specifically, multiple agency theory (e.g., Bruton et al. 2009 ) suggests that agency conflicts within the firm may vary according to different governance roles played by the corporate governance participants.”
Board Independence, Ownership Structure and the Valuation of IPOs in Continental Europe (2014, positive): “Among them, prior research has focused particularly on the role of Venture Capital (VC), also comparing different institutional environments (Bruton et al., 2010) and different control rights (Cumming, 2008).”
Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis (2016, background): “Second, we extend the institutional perspective (Bruton et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Henisz & Zelner, 2010) by exploring how institutions affect an increasingly significant form of ownership, namely state ownership of listed firms (Bruton et al., 2015).”
Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, neutral): “Bruton et al., 2009 © 2010 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies considerably with respect to their equity positions, the influence of these variations on firm actions and the holdings of other owners remains…”
Trust Between Entrepreneurs and Angel Investors (2014, background): “Thus, while our sample size of 54 may seem small compared to those used in non–survey-based entrepreneurial finance studies (e.g., Bruton et al., 2010) or in studies based on only one key respondent (e.g., De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006; Freear, Sohl, & Wetzel, 2002), it compares well to those few…”
A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators (2017, background): “Much of this work largely assumes there is an optimal configuration of formal and informal institutions conducive to VC investment; Bruton et al. (2010) indicate that this is not the case.”