An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities

By Ruth V. Aguilera, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel, Gregory Jackson. Organ. Sci., 2008

899 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/121c1ad29e1c2651cff5530def5d659a422d66c1

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Citations in the corpus

Complementary or Substitutive Effects? Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Social Responsibility (2018, background): “enhancement” when they are combined (Aguilera et al., 2008).”
Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance under Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance (2020, background): “The significant characteristics of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance include internal monitoring systems via concentrated ownership and tight inter-firm relationships that substitute for the effective monitoring mechanisms in shareholder-oriented systems [32].”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, positive): “Since CEO compensation is a major corporate governance decision and corporate governance has both external and internal mechanisms , we focus on the salient external and internal factors as contingency factors affecting CEO compensation (Aguilera et al., 2008; Pandher and Currie, 2013).”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “Taken together, the findings contribute to the growing body of literature that suggests the efficacy and universality of good governance prescriptions may be subject to contextual and firm-specific contingencies (Aguilera et al., 2008; Desender et al., 2012; Dowell et al., 2011; Judge, 2012).”
CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, positive): “These findings also complement prior literature (see, for example, Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Davidson et al. , 2004; Aguilera et al. , 2008; Duru et al. , 2016), as they offer additional evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis of internal corporate governance…”
Corporate Boards, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe Political and Economic Crisis (2012, positive): “In line with this, the organisation science literature (Scott, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008) suggests that different corporate governance structures are more or less effective depending on the context of the different organisational environments.”
Strengthening the Financial Reporting System: Can Audit Committees Deliver? (2010, neutral): “As for corporate governance research (Aguilera et al., 2008), most AC research neglects how interdependencies between the firm and diverse environments may affect the effectiveness of different AC practices.”
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence (2018, background): “…governance is defined as a set of interrelated mechanisms that has strategic or institutional complementarities to align the conflict of interests between principals and agents; this is dependent on certain combinations, including ownership structure (Aguilera et al., 2008; Desender et al., 2013).”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “…the business environment is still dominated by informal constraints rather than formal institutions (Peng and Heath, 1996), social networks and other informal ties like Guanxi usually play an important role in corporate performance and decision making (Aguilera et al., 2008; Cao et al., 2014).”