Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms

By Mike W. Peng, Yi Jiang. 2010

492 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa2d6f8dd2386a2d9bf88f68e43ebcdef7ab42a6

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Citations in the corpus

Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, unknown): “…in the HOMA and MARA calculations: (1) firms with a substantial presence of family members in owner-shipby either voting orcash flow rights (Peng & Jiang, 2010), (2) firms with a substantial presence of family members in top management positions (Miller et al., 2007), (3) firms with a…”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, methodology): “Control Variables To assess the impact of general firm characteristics, we collected the following set of control variables: firm age (Peng & Jiang, 2010), firm size (Mitton, 2002), firm leverage (Lang & Stulz, 1994), firm diversification (Mitton, 2002), and market-tobook ratio (Rajan & Zingales,…”
Corporate governance and Asian companies (2011, background): “Family ownership is a prevalent feature of corporate governance in Asia (Ahlstrom, Chen, & Yeh, 2010; Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009; Liu, Yang, & Zhang, 2011; Peng & Jiang, 2010; Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010; Zhang & Ma, 2009).”
What do we know about Private Family Firms? A Meta–Analytical Review (2015, background): “…generational effects, since there is a substantial literature that claims family firms enjoy competitive advantages in certain national contexts (Peng & Jiang, 2010; Young et al., 2008) and that family firm performance worsens Table 5 MASEM Results MASEM Results for Strategy Mediation…”
Varieties of institutional systems: A contextual taxonomy of understudied countries (2016, background): “Chrisman, 2009), founding families run their businesses directly instead of relying on professionalized management (Peng & Jiang, 2010).”
Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis (2018, background): “Scholars, therefore, recommend invoking an institution-based view by incorporating institutional factors to better understand the contextual nature of corporate governance problems (Haxhi and Aguilera, 2017; Meyer and Peng, 2016; Peng and Jiang, 2010).”
LINKING THEORY AND CONTEXT: "STRATEGY RESEARCH IN EMERGING ECONOMIES" AFTER WRIGHT ET AL. (2005) (2012, unknown): “Institutional perspectives are also a primary basis to study the triangle of relationships between institutions, family control, and firm performance (Chung and Luo, 2008; Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; Peng and Jiang, 2010).”
The three faces of China: Strategic alliance partner selection in three ethnic Chinese economies (2014, background): “One could expect that China, with its lower level of development to emphasize informal institutions, especially because its reforms regarding law and governance have developed only haltingly (Brødsgaard, 2002; Peng & Jiang, 2010).”
Innovation and Family Ownership: Empirical Evidence from India (2014, background): “For example, Singh and Gaur (2009) used only 400 Indian firms, whereas Peng and Jiang (2010) used 634 family firms for seven emerging markets in their studies.”
Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, methodology): “While our findings support the view that family CEOs enhance firm value in less developed institutional environments, it is worth noting that Peng and Jiang (2010) show a negative relationship between family CEOs and firm value in countries with less developed institutions.”
The relationship between innovation, knowledge, and performance in family and non-family firms: an analysis of SMEs (2013, background): “…of family firms, such as the differences in family involvement and the long-term orientation of family members, may affect many different aspects of the firm (Chrisman et al. 2010; Gedajlovic and Carney 2010; Ling and Kellermanns 2009; Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Peng and Jiang 2010).”
Preserving Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: Asset or Liability? The Moderating Role of Business Context (2013, background): “Traditionally, the debate has clustered around three positions, suggesting that having a family CEO is “good,” “bad,” or “irrelevant” for performance (Peng & Jiang, 2010).”
Driving factors of innovation in family and non-family SMEs (2018, background): “…owns at least 50% of shares and at least one family member is part of the management team (European Commission 2009; see also Classen et al. 2014; Chua et al. 1999; Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007; Peng and Jiang 2010; Posch andWiedenegger 2014;Westhead and Cowling 1998; Zellweger et al. 2012a, b).”