Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers

By Francis Bloch. 2003

209 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f07f038d728949d877f9d40a1bf62532b614ab05

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements (2006, background): “…agreements have be described as games of coalition formation and have been studied by Hoel (1992), Barrett (1994), Na and Shin (1998) and others; see Bloch (2003) for a general survey of coalition formation games and Finus (2003) for a survey focusing on international environmental agreements.”
Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements (2012, methodology): “ll as of alternative approaches to cooperation, see Bloch (2003), Chander and Tulkens (2008), Finus”
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties (2009, unknown): “Under suitable assumptions (A.2 and A.3 below), the third stage of the game can be reduced to a partition function (Bloch 1997; Yi, 1997, 2003).”
Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006, unknown): “Following the literature (cf. Bloch 1997), we assume that the coalition and single regions play a Nash equilibrium in terms of abatement strategies.”
Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements (2008, background): “The other view is rooted in non-cooperative game theory and became the dominant path in the literature (Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994)).”
Market sharing agreements and collusive networks (2004, unknown): “(See Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997).)”
Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, background): “See for instance Bloch (2003) and Finus (2001) overviews.”
Regional versus global cooperation for climate control (2006, background): “2 A number of reduced-stage models have addressed the possibility of giving countries the freedom to negotiate more than one climate agreement [10, 11, 12, 17].”
Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers (2004, methodology): “ subcoalitions. Table 10.1 in Bloch (1997) summarizes the outcomes or”
Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements (2003, background): “Lemma 2 A nontrivial transfer scheme satisfying the individual enforcement constraint (4) exists if and only if d′(0, n) > 0.”
Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule (2009, unknown): “has been surveyed by Bloch (2003) and Yi (2003).”