Regional versus global cooperation for climate control

By G. Asheim, C. B. Froyn, J. Hovi, F. Menz. 2006

174 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Global and Planetary Change

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4af6abca2ab7eec95a15765278fe0bfe16fde73

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Guiomar Martín-Herrán
2. Olof Johansson-Stenman
3. Georges Zaccour
4. Steffen Jørgensen
5. James Konow
6. Michael Finus
7. Baizhou Li
8. Shi Yin

In Global and Planetary Change

1. Olof Johansson-Stenman
2. Michael Finus

Citations in the corpus

• EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS (2012, background): “Whether game participants are world citizens, world regions or country leaders, it remains unclear at which scale global warming should be tackled.(40,61) Indeed, besides perception of risk, group size may play a pivotal role when maximizing the likelihood of reaching overall cooperation.”
• Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, background): “• Stackelberg leadership [11, 55, 172] • Transfers [40, 103] • Reputation effects [36, 103, 106] • Issue linkages [12, 26, 41, 125, 127, 139, 154] • Punishments [12, 13] • Regional rather than global agreements [7]”
• Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental Economics (2010, background): “, Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), Asheim et al. (2006), but almost all of this literature assumes that each negotiating country cares solely about its own material payoff (cf. Barrett 2005). Some of this literature concerns repeated games, i.e., negotiations occur not once, but rather multiple times,”
• Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations (2014, unknown): “Asheim et al. (2006) posit that more public goods could be provided by two regional coalitions of fewer participants than by one large agreement.”
• Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, methodology): “These papers confirm the superiority of multiple compared to a single agreements as this is also done by Asheim et al. (2006) in a compliance model. A different conclusion is reached in Bosello et al. (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2005b) with the FEEM-RICE model.”