Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements
By Simon Dietz, C. Marchiori, Alessandro Tavoni. 2012
211 citations recorded by the source corpus.
The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a strong analogy with the behaviour of an individual or firm in other strategic contexts. In reality, however, various domestic special interests shape environmental policy, including how national governments cooperate on cross-border issues. Therefore in this paper we introduce to a classic model of international environmental cooperation the phenomenon of domestic political competition, whereby lobby groups seek to influence policy by offering to fund political campaigning. We use the model to establish some general conditions for the effects of lobbying on the stringency of policy and the size of coalitions cooperating to provide an environmental good. Using specific functional forms, we obtain a range of further results, including circumstances in which the omission of lobbying results in environmental protection being underestimated.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6e28e086c52c4abe9360b27ffa865b3f863fc7b
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Astrid Dannenberg
- Andreas Löschel
- Jonathan F. Donges
- Alessandro Tavoni
- Gabriele Paolacci
- V. Costantini
- Chiara Martini
Citations in the corpus
- Defining tipping points for social-ecological systems scholarship—an interdisciplinary literature review (2018, methodology): “Methodologically, this work often uses a case-study approach, a range of explanatory conceptual frameworks, but also quantitative modeling, including bifurcation theory (Lade et al 2013, Sugiarto et al 2015, Biggs et al 2009).”
- On the Provision of Public Goods with Probabilistic and Ambiguous Thresholds (2015, background): “It follows that a precautionary approach to managing ecosystems may be instrumental in coping with uncertain threshold effects and reducing the likelihood of irreversible regime shifts (Lade et al. 2013).”