Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers
By Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch. 2004
74 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8fc15ea7207efc030b2c47ee7b566465ee0e37bc
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions (2008, background): “Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) refine the LCS by assuming that defecting coalition S0 should contemplate the possibility to end with positive probability at any coalition structure B ∈ Y , where V = B or V B.”