Michael Finus
Economics and Econometrics · 2006–2008
A researcher in the Science corpus: 3 papers; trusts 12 researchers and is trusted by 0 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Subfields
- Economics and Econometrics — 26 citations into it
Whom Michael Finus trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
- Charles D. Kolstad
- Francis Bloch
- Henry Tulkens
- Carlo Carraro
- Aart de Zeeuw
- Hans-Peter Weikard
- Ulrich J. Wagner
- Christoph Böhringer
- Andreas Lange
- J. Hovi
Who trusts Michael Finus overall
Papers from Michael Finus's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Michael Finus trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
- Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control
- Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity
- The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
- Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
- Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements
- Computable general equilibrium models for sustainability impact assessment: Status quo and prospects
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy
- Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming
Their papers
- The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements (2006) — 89 citations
- Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008) — 232 citations
- Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006) — 152 citations