Hans-Peter Weikard

Economics and Econometrics · 2006–2009

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 4 researchers and is trusted by 4 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom Hans-Peter Weikard trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Michael Finus
  2. Francis Bloch
  3. Carlo Carraro
  4. Scott Barrett
  5. Matthew McGinty

Who trusts Hans-Peter Weikard overall

  1. Michael Finus
  2. Anna Alberini
  3. William Nordhaus

Papers from Hans-Peter Weikard's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Hans-Peter Weikard trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
  2. Transfers to Sustain Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control
  3. The Economics of Climate Change
  4. The marginal damage costs of carbon-dioxide emissions’
  5. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
  6. Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements
  7. Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements
  8. Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity
  9. The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
  10. Computable general equilibrium models for sustainability impact assessment: Status quo and prospects

Their papers