Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements

By Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray. 2003

255 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c11362a27c9fe5613076fe9bf04ef59a2f3524ea

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Citations in the corpus

A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings (2011, background): “1. Extensions of the seminal paper by Coate and Ravall ion include work accommodating altruism among individuals (especially kin members) by Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), non-stationary transfers (Ligon et al., 2002), and group stability in the context of risk-sharing among subgroups ( Genicot and R”
Group-Based Funeral Insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania. (2006, background): “Genicot and Ray (2003) have suggested that pure ''informal'' groups of mutual support , that are stable to sub-groups breaking away and setting up their own informal arrangement, may well only be very small.”
Positional spending and status seeking in rural China (2011, background): “…stationary schemes, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2003) consider non-stationary schemes with history-dependent transfers – blurring the distinction between insurance and credit – and Genicot and Ray (2003) analyze coalition stability in the presence of potential defection by subgroups of individuals.”
Persistent poverty and informal credit (2011, background): “tracting choices, as the literature on peer selection in micro-credit arrangements suggests (Ghatak, 1999, Sadoulet and Carpenter, 1999). Agents might therefore rationally opt out of insurance contracts with those whose wealth covaries strongly with their own wealth. We’ll address this possibility b”
Risk-Sharing Networks (2007, background): “In a larger population, the deviating agent could be punished by all other agents or some subset of agents (see Genicot and Ray (2003)). gregate outcomes.6 In the present paper, individual interactions determine the risk-sharing networks, which in turn determines the extent of risk-sharing within…”
Risk Sharing Between Households (2011, background): “For instance, households with a high average income may individually opt out of arrangements that require households to share their pooled income equally Ho¤ (1996). This is because equal sharing implies a redistribution of income from the rich to the poor.”
Social Connections and Group Banking (2007, background): “See Genicot and Ray (2003) for a theoretical discussion of such dynamics.”