The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
By Hans-Peter Weikard, J. Altamirano-Cabrera, Michael Finus. 2006
89 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/70e458bae699fc6cfb3e28e275a20fc854c97b46
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Michael Finus
- William Nordhaus
- Richard S. J. Tol
- Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
- John D. Sterman
- Reyer Gerlagh
- Delavane Diaz
- S. Keen
In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Michael Finus
- William Nordhaus
- Richard S. J. Tol
- S. Keen
- L. Barrage
- Martin Weitzman
- T. Sterner
- F. Moore
Citations in the corpus
- Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy † (2015, background): “…on carbon prices is that it can operate as a single-dimensional choice and thereby avoid stab-in-the-back instability.1 A study of climate regimes by Weikard, Finus, and Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) confirms the potential for instability in climate agreements with transfers (see the online Appendix).”
- Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008, result): “The subsequent results are compiled from Finus et al. (2004, 2005, 2006), Weikard et al. (2006), and Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008).”