Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, background): “further extend Bandiera et al.’s finding (2015) that managers with high-powered incentives are more likely to be university-educated and hold a business education award.”
Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance (2019, unknown): “For contributions focusing on both executive and ﬁrm characteristics, see Bandiera et al. (2011) and Lippi and Schivardi (2014).”
Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence (2018, unknown): “13 Bandiera et al. (2009) find evidence that Italian family firms hires managers with lower average ability.”
Productivity growth in Italy: a tale of a slow-motion change (2018, unknown): “Indeed familyowned firms, particularly Italian ones, tend to prefer an executive selection process based on closeness and fidelity to the owners rather than on specific expertise with regard to the company’s business sector and strategies (Bandiera et al., 2015; Lippi and Schivardi, 2014).”
CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation (2016, background): “While Bandiera et al. (2015) provide survey-based evidence that Italian female managers are on average less risk tolerant than their male peers, Adams and Funk (2012) find Swedish female directors to be on average less risk-averse than male directors.”