The Consequences of Forced CEO Succession for Outside Directors

By K. Farrell, David A. Whidbee. 2000

178 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e2fb64ac6b5b3f9f43de10ddd5d4130a88dd7d31

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Citations in the corpus

Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “Studies on non-financial firms show that career opportunities in the directorship market depend on independent directors achieving good past performance in the execution of their mandate (Coles and Hoi 2003; Farrell and Whidbee 2000; Gilson, 1990; Harford 2003; Jiang et al., 2015).”
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors (2006, unknown): “This pattern is documented for financially distressed companies (Gilson (1990)), for firms that cut dividends (Kaplan and Reishus (1990)) and opt out of stringent state antitakeover provisions (Coles and Hoi (2003)), for companies that fire their CEOs (Farrell and Whidbee (2000)), for firms that are”
Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover (2002, background): “Further, Farrell and Whidbee (2000) find evidence that outside directors are rewarded with additional outside directorships when they remove a poorly performing CEO and replace him or her with a CEO that improves firm performance.”
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions (2011, methodology): “In addition to the L-index and the G-index, other control variables included in the analysis follow Farrell and Whidbee (2000) and Yermack (2004).”
Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “1 See Brickley, Coles and Linck (1999), Farrell and Whidbee (2000), Yermack (2004), Kaplan and Reishsus (1990),”
Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender (2005, unknown): “, Fryxell and Lerner, 1989; Harrigan, 1981). We account for these differences by combining firms into industry classifications primarily based on three- and four-digit primary SIC codes and creating industry fixed effects based on these classifications. To capture firm heterogeneity within industrie”
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, background): “Signals of sound corporate governance, such as rejecting anti‐takeover provisions (Coles & Hoi, 2003 ) and forcing out underperforming CEOs (Farrell & Whidbee, 2000 ), also lead to longer tenure in existing board appointments and invitations to join new boards.”
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures (2003, background): “Gilson (1990), for example, found that the number of additional directorships held by directors of financially distressed firms decreased each 438 Academy o/ Managemenf fleview July year for three years following financial distress (see also Farrell & Whidbee, 2000, and Kaplan & Reishus, 1990).”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “For instance, Farrell and Whidbee (2000) perform their analysis of the consequences of forced CEO turnovers with a sample of 66 forced turnovers for the period 1981 to 1992.”
Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, unknown): “(2011), Ferreira and Matos (2008)).”
Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “1 See Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Farrell and Whidbee, 2000; Coles and Hoi, 2003; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Harford, 2003; Yermack, 2004; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 2008; Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben, 2010.”