Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?

By Ronald W. Masulis, Shawn Mobbs. 2014

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21bb58390c7c72b37719e103af22f2dd8dd66e05

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Citations in the corpus

Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “…are eported to enhance governance quality and market transparency Jiang et al., 2016 ), discipline the board and increase monitorng quality ( Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014 ). iven these results, we argue that the reputation of female direc- ors contributes to improving…”
Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2017, unknown): “Masulis and Mobbs (2014), for example, report an average (median) of 66.”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “on Masulis and Mobbs (2014). To account for time invariant director, firm and industry characteristics, we include models with director and industry by year fixed effects, or director, firm and year fixed effects.”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, methodology): “Our empirical set-up is similar to Masulis and Mobbs (2014).”
Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “Furthermore, reputation concerns also affect the supply of director services in the labor market, with directors that are members of the boards of large corporations increasing their effort in performing their duties (see Masulis and Mobbs, 2014; 2016).”
Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, unknown): “Just like independent directors value their directorships differently and exert more effort on the ones they perceive to be more prestigious (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014), institutions could have incentives to monitor portfolio positions more than others.”
How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions (2019, unknown): “We control for the fraction of busy independent directors who hold three or more directorships, as well as other controls found 27 in prior research to influence firm value and performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).”
Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? (2016, background): “On the other hand, having other directorships is a signal of director ability (e.g. Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).”