Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating

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Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “Our results indicate that not all directorships are equal in terms of the reputation incentives they offer, which can help to explain why some studies such as Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) find weak evidence of the directorship market rewarding or punishing directors.”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “In sum, our findings suggest that activist groups such as ActionAid can influence corporate outcomes, consistent with other research that shows firms respond to pressure from external stakeholders (Ertimur et al. 2012; Smith 1995) and that suggests real consequences to”